Doctrine:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is
an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule
be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on
the basis of unsubstantial allegations.
Facts:
The Embassy of the Republic of Korea
wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfried Mison, Chairperson of the
Bureau of Immigation (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of
respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Pursuant to
Summary Deportation Order, Ku was arrested and detained at the BI detention
center.
Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether
or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled in negative.
Section 1 of the Rule in the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:
Section 1. Petition. –
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Amparo rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of the “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
As to what constitutes enforced
disappearance, the Court in Navia v.
Pardico enumerated the elements constituting enforced disappearances as the
term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of the RA 9851, to wit:
(a)
That
there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b)
That
it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or political organization;
(c)
That
it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and
(d)That the intention for such refusal
is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
In probing enforced disappearance
cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA 9851.
Guided by the parameters of RA 9851,
we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory
definition of an enforced disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of
the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such
arrest nor was there any refusal to give information to remove Ku from the
protection of the law for a prolonged time. More importantly, there was no
attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the
Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured
as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant
of Deportation.
The RTC’s grant of the privilege of
the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were
never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security
were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental
function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning
the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party.
As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance
of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
Wherefore, premises considered, the
Court hereby resolves to deny the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
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