Facts:
Respondents, together with their
mother Dominga, filed a complaint for annulment of document with damages
against petitioner Salvador Comilang. The complaint alleges that respondents
are the owner of a parcel of land and house built thereon; respondents acquired
the subject property through their earnings while working abroad; and the
subject property was declared for taxation purposes in the Dominga’s name as
administrator.
Petitioner caused the execution
of a Deed of Donation over said property by taking advantage of Dominga’s
blindness, old age and physical infirmity.
RTC rendered decision in favor
of respondents and deed of donation null and void.
CA sustained the conclusion of
the RTC that the donation is void.
Petitioner assails the CAs application of
the principle of implied trust to nullify the Deed of Donation executed in his
favor. He asserts that the
existence of an implied trust between respondents and Dominga in relation to
the subject property was never treated by the RTC nor was it brought in issue
on appeal before the CA. Petitioner
further argues that Margaritas statement on the witness stand that Dominga told
her that the respondents sent her money to buy the subject property, should not
have been given weight or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay
and has no probative value.
Issue:
Whether or
not Margarita’s testimony is hearsay.
Ruling:
No.
Anent Margaritas testimony that Dominga told her
that the respondents sent her (Dominga) money to buy the subject property, it
cannot be categorized as hearsay evidence. Margaritas testimony was not
presented to prove the truth thereof, but only to establish the fact that
Dominga narrated to Margarita the source of the funds used in the purchase of
the subject property. What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what
was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact that the statement was made by
Dominga to Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by her were
true. The said utterance is in the nature of an independently relevant
statement which may be admitted in evidence as such, but not necessarily to
prove the truth thereof.
Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a
witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish
the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence,
it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely
to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the
fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as
to the making of the statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. For this
reason, the statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds
used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is
admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the
tenor thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the
main basis for the RTCs decision. In fact, her testimony is not
indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the testimonies of the
respondents on the source of the funds used in purchasing the subject
property. The testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were
found to be convincing and credible by the RTC. This Court will not alter
the findings of the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally because
trial courts have vastly superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in
detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe the manner and
demeanor of witnesses while testifying.
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