Facts:
Special Counsel Arcadio Aguila filed with the
Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas, an information charging respondent Rita De
los Reyes of the crime of estafa.
The information reads as follows:
That in, about and
during the period comprised between April 27, 1982 to June, 1972, inclusive, in
the Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then an employee of one
Luz E. Balitaan, owner of a baby dresses mending shop in Barrio Aplaya of the
said municipality and having collected and received from Uniware, Inc., a
business establishment in Makati, Rizal, to which finished baby dresses are
turned over after they have been mended and made, the sum of P127.58 in payment
of work done on baby dresses by said Luz E. Balitaan, and under the express
obligation on the part of the accused to immediately account for and deliver
the said amount of P127.58 to said Luz E. Balitaan, with unfaithfulness and
grave abuse of confidence and in spite of repeated demands made to the said
accused to turn over the said amount of P127.58, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the sum of
P127.58 to her (accused) own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Luz E. Balitaan in the aforementioned amount of P127.58.
Contrary to law.
At the initial hearing on
September 18, 1973, complaining witness Luz E. Balitaan, herein petitioner, was
called as the prosecution's first witness. She testified that she was the
proprietress of a baby dress mending shop, that her business was engaged in the
sewing of baby dresses with the accused, Rita de los Reyes, herein respondent,
as the one in charge of the management of her business, including the
procurement of unsewed baby dresses from, and the delivery of finished dresses
to Unaware, Inc.
At this juncture, counsel
for the accused Rita de los Reyes objected to the testimony of complaining
witness, Luz E. Balitaan and presented two motions.
Issue:
Whether or not there is variance
between the allegation in the information for estafa and the proof established
by the petitioner’s testimony.
Ruling:
No.
It is fundamental that every element
of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be
determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific
crimes.
Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as the crime of
estafa through misappropriation or with grave abuse of confidence is charged,
the information must contain these elements: (a) that personal property is
received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or
diversion of such property by the person who has so received it; (c) that such
conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (d) that there
be demand for the return of the property.
The main purpose of requiring the various elements of
a crime to be set out in information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
However, it is often difficult to say what is a matter
of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to
render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a
general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the
description of the offense, need not be averred. Moreover,
reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. All that is required
is that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed and
will enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to
plead her conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Applying these principles, The Court ruled that the
existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the Information. This is
an evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged therein. Further, that
these checks, as testified by petitioner amounted to P1,632.97 did not vary the
allegation in the Information that respondent Rita de los Reyes misappropriated
the amount of P127.58. Proof of the checks and their total amount was material
evidence of the fact that respondent misappropriated the amount of P127.58
which was but a part of the total sum of the checks.
Inasmuch as the Information herein sufficiently
charges the crime of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, Revised Penal
Code, We shall now determine whether the testimonies of complaining witness
prove the same or tend to prove instead estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same
article.
It is true that estafa under paragraph 1(b) is
essentially a different offense from estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same
article because the elements of these two offenses are not the same. In estafa
under paragraph 1(b), which is committed with grave abuse of confidence, it
must be shown that the offender received money or other personalty in trust or on
commission or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same but misappropriated it to the
prejudice of another. It is also necessary that previous demand be made on the
offender. To sustain a conviction for estafa under paragraph 2(a), on the other
hand, deceit or false representation to defraud and the damage caused thereby
must be proved. And no demand is necessary.
This does not mean, however, that presentation of
proof of deceit in a prosecution for estafa under paragraph 1(b) is not
allowed. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be
present, the abuse of confidence win characterize the estafa as the deceit will
be merely incidental or as the Supreme Court of Spain held, is absorbed by
abuse of confidence.
It has also been held that as long as there is a
relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the accused and
even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false
representations and pretense and which is continued by active deceit without
truthfully disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by
abuse of confidence although deceit co-exists in its commission.
Thus, the questioned testimony eliciting the fact that
accused respondent falsely represented to the complainant-petitioner that the
amount of P127.58 out of the total of P1,632.97 belonged to Cesar Dalangin may
not be said to be at variance with the allegations of the Information. The
presence of deceit would not change the whole theory of the prosecution that
estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. Besides, in estafa by means of
deceit, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to
part with the thing. The municipal court properly denied, therefore, the
motion to strike out the testimonies anent use of false representations.
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